

# 7 Building and Measuring Sustainable Networks of Organizations and Social Capital

## Postwar Public Diplomacy in Croatia

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### INTRODUCTION

The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the product of several years of diplomatic negotiations. It marked the formal end of war in the Balkans and heralded the beginning of an ambitious public diplomacy initiative to build a democratic foundation and civil society. What made the task particularly daunting was that the former communist nations had few if any organizations that were not government sponsored. Nonprofit civil society organizations were needed, and needed quickly; a stipulation of the peace agreement called for parliamentary and presidential elections for the newly created nations.

Both the United States and the European Union (EU) started immediate programs of humanitarian aid and interactive public diplomacy in the Balkan countries. How successful were these public diplomacy efforts? This chapter argues that the Croatian public diplomacy efforts were among the most successful U.S. public diplomacy campaigns. Public diplomacy, enacted by foreign aid to civil society groups, helped to create a network of advocacy organizations that brought the values of human rights and democracy into the everyday public discourse of Croatian society. Not only did the Croatian NGOs play a pivotal role in the first democratic elections after the war, but the public diplomacy efforts also created a “network of organizations” and social capital that enabled them to continue their mission long after foreign assistance ended.

Successful public diplomacy means building up communication “networks of networks” consisting of people who share common values. This chapter explores U.S. public diplomacy efforts in postwar Croatia through the relational lens. The first part provides a conceptual foundation for a relational approach to public diplomacy based on network theory and social capital.<sup>1</sup> The second section discusses public diplomacy efforts in Croatia from 1998 to 2000 by tracing public perceptions of civil society topics in Croatia after the aid ended. The third section tackles the question of measurement and

presents an approach for assessing the long-term relational dynamics of the public diplomacy initiatives. The final section features conclusions, recommendations, and ethical considerations for public diplomacy practitioners as they work to increase international understanding and build relationships with publics across the world.

## BUILDING NETWORKS OF ORGANIZATIONS

Writing during the Cold War, Gifford D. Malone called public diplomacy “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments.”<sup>2</sup> But those days have passed. One-way image cultivation campaigns intended to “win the hearts and minds” of the people have proven ineffective. Many nations—Ethiopia, Malaysia, and Haiti, for example—have strong relations among the media, government, and business. Reporters and station managers often hold very different values about appropriate topics for reporting, and image cultivation efforts by foreign nations to influence the media are met with suspicion and enmity.

Benno Signitzer and Carola Wamser have called for a generic approach that involved multiple theories, multiple systems of analysis, and multiple media channels as a way to better understand both public relations and public diplomacy.<sup>3</sup> The scholars argue that in modern public diplomacy, “relations are becoming more and more closely connected with actors other than national governments.”<sup>4</sup> There is a shift away from the traditional, state-level diplomacy and toward public, citizen-level diplomacy.” Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs), and even the entertainment industries now have more influence over how citizens in one nation view another nation than governmental strategic communication campaigns.

Additionally, public relations and public diplomacy are generally more effective and most ethical when they promote relationships among citizens and organizations. Public diplomacy efforts in the form of humanitarian or development assistance can have lasting impact. For instance, some public diplomacy efforts train journalists in how to report on public information and health campaigns.<sup>5</sup> More public diplomacy success has come from community-based efforts than from one-way, top-down image cultivation strategies. We believe that understanding the networks of relationships that are the outcomes of public diplomacy efforts will help academics and diplomacy professionals move forward in understanding an evolving public diplomacy process.

The shift from mass communication to interpersonal and group communication has had a big influence. If we move away from a focus on images and messages and instead focus on organizations, or what Signitzer and Wamser termed “systems,” then public diplomacy efforts can extend

beyond cultivating an image about the United States or another country. Instead, efforts should be devoted to building relationships among national governmental organizations and local NGOs across the world.

We suggest that public diplomacy's most important assets lie in networks of organizations with shared values. Interactions between organizations are unique ways to understand relationships. Such a focus moves the level of analysis in public diplomacy away from messages and directs it toward inter-organizational relationships that build social capital. Social capital, as highlighted in this chapter, provides critical insights for public diplomacy scholarship that have to this point been under examined.

Social capital is created by a system of trusting and supportive interconnected organizations.<sup>6</sup> Social capital "consist[s] of some aspects of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors-whether persons or corporate actor-within the structure."<sup>7</sup> Social capital is enhanced by certain organization actions such as collaborative networks, cooperation, information sharing, and resource mobilization.

As Peter Monge and Noshir Contractor suggest, social capital is created when organizational members communicate and enter into relationships with others.<sup>8</sup> The outcome of these relationships includes new opportunities, information, and access to a variety of resources. Thus, social networks based on communicatively constructed inter-organizational relationships create social capital.<sup>9</sup> Activist organizations, for example, cooperate to fight for animal rights legislation; religious and social groups work to provide food and shelter to the poor; and governmental health and aid efforts (USAID, PEPFAR, etc.) all build social capital and contribute to soft-power public diplomacy.

Governmental efforts like USAID or PEPFAR provide resources to train journalists in better health and social reporting. In the process, these programs also spawn and strengthen relationships among and between journalists, health specialists, and governmental officials. Many observers tend to focus on the achievement of objective tasks in such programs and overlook the public diplomacy implications of how providing training and interacting with the public on health projects can help build social networks and create social capital. Indeed, the synergistic power of collective group activities is often underestimated as a public diplomacy outcome and tool.

Organizations not directly related to the U.S. government can also enact programs that support U.S. values every day. Organizations such as the Habitat for Humanity work to make affordable housing a basic human right. Similarly, organizations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Rotary Club, and different membership organizations such as the Kiwanis Club International also advocate on behalf of U.S. values of education, community engagement, service, open markets, and participatory government to people across the world.

If the goal of U.S. and Western European public diplomacy efforts is to build social capital, then fostering relationships with local organizations

that share their values may be the best way to accomplish public diplomacy outcomes. The relationships among U.S. and Western European donor organizations and their local counterparts are another example of coordinated strategic communication.

The next section provides a longitudinal case study of Croatians' evolving perceptions of civil society. The data from three points in time (2000, 2002, and 2004) are used to assess the outcomes of public diplomacy efforts of the international community as they worked to strengthen Croatian media institutions and civil society.

### **PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY: FOSTERING RELATIONSHIPS WITH LOCAL NGOs**

After the Dayton Peace Agreement, both the United States and the EU started immediate programs of humanitarian aid and interactive public diplomacy in Croatia. The Dayton Peace Agreement between the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia marked the formal cessation of hostilities. But the agreement was only a first step; nationalist political leaders controlled both Croatia and Yugoslavia. In Croatia, Franjo Tudjman and his nationalist HDZ party ran all aspects of the government. In Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic similarly controlled activities in his nation. Tudjman and Milosevic, however, were the elected leaders of their nations, and no amount of world pressure was able to unseat them from power.<sup>10</sup> However, the United States and the EU recognized that peace in the region would not last if nationalist politicians continued to lead the nations.

After the Dayton Peace Agreement, the governments in the United States and Europe wanted to ensure that democratic elections would be held in Croatia.<sup>11</sup> Significant amounts of international humanitarian assistance were devoted to Croatia and Bosnia. An important part of that assistance was to help establish civil society organizations and independent media in these nations to facilitate democracy building.

In Croatia, both government affiliated and international humanitarian organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the British Department for International Development (DFID), the Soros Open Society Institute (OSI), and the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) started to fund civil society initiatives. These international organizations helped to prepare newly formed local grassroots nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for the much anticipated (but unscheduled) democratic elections.

Building up a network of NGOs was not easy. Before 1990, the existence of non-state organizations was foreign throughout much of Eastern and Central Europe. In communist nations, there were few, if any, civil society organizations that existed outside of the state. The Western governments' funding of public diplomacy efforts in Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia

sought to reinforce, create, and sustain nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Efforts also focused on helping independent media outlets work for voting rights, peace, women's issues, and political reforms. Many Western governments believe that media independence is a foundation for democracy building.

One can look at these public diplomacy efforts through a relational lens. When the Western governments and humanitarian NGOs provided technical and financial support for local media, NGOs, and activist groups that shared their values, they were enacting a relational approach to public diplomacy. The civil society transition in Croatia is considered a success story for international donors.<sup>12</sup> During the late 1990s, the U.S. and European governments dedicated approximately 16.5–19.5 percent of their total aid budgets in Eastern Europe to NGOs and democracy-building efforts.<sup>13</sup> The social capital built up within the networks had financial benefits; Croatian NGOs often cooperated with each other to maximize the financial assistance and expertise offered by international donors.<sup>14</sup> Their actions had significant implications in 1999 and 2000. These civil society organizations, run by Croatians, for Croatians, created a grassroots movement—effectively expanding their relations into a network of organizations. When the calls for democracy, free and fair elections, and women's issues grew louder, they were no longer coming from foreign governments. The calls originated from within the network; they were from Croatians.

## CROATIA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The lead-up to the 2000 elections in Croatia showed dozens of NGOs, supported by Western donors, working within their network of organizations to communicate information about the upcoming elections. The 2000 parliamentary election campaign was important to the future of Croatia because it was the end of the Tudjman regime, and, thus, the first time a democratic election was possible.

Looking in the rearview mirror to study the civil society network in Croatia is important for several reasons. First, foreign donors facilitated relationships among domestic Croatian organizations and supported coalitions to amplify NGO efforts. Second, at the time, the exact dates of the pending Croatian parliamentary and presidential elections were unknown. In Croatia, when the parliament announced the election, candidates and parties had a very short period to mobilize public support for change. This was a common practice in nations where the government seeks to weaken the opposition by allowing them little time to prepare for an election.

On November 27, 1999, acting president Vlatko Pavletic announced the parliamentary election would take place on January 3, 2000. On December 10, 1999, Franjo Tudjman died, suddenly shifting the political dynamic in the country. The pro-democracy movement had five weeks to communicate

their messages, reassure voters that this would be a fair election, and educate the public about the major issues facing the nation. Because of the strong network of activists and media organizations that had been built in Croatia, there was reservoir of social capital. With this social capital, the network of organizations was able to cooperate, to create a non-partisan movement, and to ensure that accurate information and fair elections took place.

In January 2000, Croatians elected a new parliament, and the nationalist HDZ party lost much of its power. With the election of reformist parliament and President Stjepan (Stipe) Mesic, Croatia started on the path to democracy. Soon after the election, Croatia entered into discussions with the EU and applied for membership in 2003. Croatia is now set to become the twenty-eighth member of the European Union on July 1, 2013.

## TACKLING THE QUESTION OF MEASUREMENT

Croatia's successful transition to democracy and EU membership provides the opportunity to study the outcomes of public diplomacy efforts. If we accept that public diplomacy should be based on systems or networks, then the time period from 1998 to 2004 in Croatia may be a valuable example to illustrate the outcome of public diplomacy efforts that built networks of NGOs and created social capital.

Maureen Taylor and Marya Doerfel studied the Croatian NGO and media network that operated before, during, and after the 2000 elections and outlined a methodology for measuring features of that network that are applicable to other public diplomacy actors.<sup>15</sup> Their research found that this pro-democracy network was primarily supported (both financially and technically) by Western governments. Croatian NGOs, such as Citizens Organized to Monitor Elections (GONG), Helsinki Human Rights (HHO), and the environmental group Green Action, all received large amounts of training and financial support from international donors.<sup>16</sup>

For our task here, we are interested in assessing the long-term impact of the development efforts of the initial public diplomacy efforts. The immediate and early results of the network of organizations had been a success, but would the network and the core values be sustainable? And, more important for the donors, would the network continue without foreign support?

In the former Yugoslavia, Croatia was one of the wealthiest republics. However, Croatia's economy had suffered since independence, and unemployment has ranged from 12 to 17 percent. Croatia will officially join the EU in 2013 after a long acceptance process that required changes in the political, economic, legal, and social systems.

The research team selected the capital city, Zagreb, as the site for the study. There are approximately 4 million Croatians, and 25 percent of them live in Zagreb. The city of Zagreb is the cultural, economic, and media capital of Croatia. Croatians have traditionally had a high literacy rate, and

Zagreb has a saturated media market with dozens of television stations, radio stations, daily papers, and weekly papers vying for limited advertising revenue. As the capital, Zagreb is also home to the nation's parliament, and it is the county seat of government for the surrounding towns. There is a vibrant NGO sector in Zagreb, with most of the international and national organizations headquartered there.

For the six-year period 1998–2004, we wanted to examine how public attitudes evolved on the issues that the network originally had advocated. These issues included the importance of civil society groups in Croatia, NGOs cooperation with government, and citizens' desire to participate in civil society activities. We were also interested in whether the local NGOs that had been originally financed (in 1998–2000) and trained by foreign governments were still perceived by the Croatian public to be active and influential in building social capital in Croatia in 2002 and 2004. It is important to point out that the surveys were collected during the summers of 2000, 2002, and 2004, two and four years *after* the United States and EU had withdrawn most of their donations to the NGO network.<sup>17</sup> We asked two research questions, noted below, designed to assess the impact and provide evidence of lasting outcomes of the public diplomacy efforts.

Our first general research question was: "How has the Croatian public's understanding of the role of non-governmental organizations in civil society evolved over time?" This question was based on the assumption that the network of NGOs supported by public diplomacy efforts generally share the same values as the EU and the United States, and played an important role in Croatia's political transition. Just because there are NGOs in a country does not necessarily mean that there will be civil society. The existence of NGOs is *necessary* for the potential for civil society, but their presence is not *sufficient* for civil society development.<sup>18</sup>

For this first question, we asked respondents to indicate whether (1) civil society organizations are important for improving the situation in Croatia; (2) civil society organizations should cooperate with the government to improve the situation in Croatia; and (3) the person surveyed wants to participate in civil society. Responses were based on 5-point Likert scales with 5 meaning "strongly agree" and 1 meaning "strongly disagree." The questions were asked over four years, in three time periods (2000, 2002, 2004).

After we had gauged respondents' knowledge and attitudes toward NGOs, survey participants were asked to identify which specific NGOs had emerged as leaders of civil society in Croatia. We asked this question to probe deeper into the public's perceptions of NGO groups, and their awareness of group activities.

Our second general question was, "In what ways has the Croatian public's understanding of the leaders of the NGO movement evolved over time?" This second question assumes that the general public's view of the quality and value of civil society activities is a better indicator of their overall social value than is asking members and leaders of the groups themselves

to rate their social value. All members of groups and organizations are self-interested, and stepping outside of one's comfort zone is difficult. Since the NGOs naturally claim in their annual reports and public relations materials that they have achieved their goals, an outside assessment from the public served was a necessary step to measure real impact. Open-ended questions were used, and interviewees were asked to identify the specific NGOs in Zagreb that were (1) most active, (2) most trusted, and (3) most influential in civil society in Croatia. Since the groups were quite new in 2000, the three questions were only asked in 2002 and 2004.

In order to locate evidence of the outcome of the network approach to public diplomacy, we drew upon primary and secondary data. The primary data came from the survey responses and the open-ended questions. The use of open-ended questions allowed respondents to name as many or as few organizations as they desired. Open-ended question also minimized the chances that respondents would merely select the names of organizations from a list of NGOs provided to them. Based on the responses from survey participants, a roster of key organizations was developed. This secondary data identified the major recipients of foreign assistance from 1998 to 2000 and compared the names mentioned by the Croatian citizens with the names of recipients of public diplomacy assistance before the 2000 elections.


The assumption guiding the research was that organizations originally supported by the public diplomacy efforts from 1998 to 2000 would continue to be leaders in Croatian civil society in 2002 and 2004. The research questions sought to provide data to show if there were lasting outcomes from U.S. and EU public diplomacy efforts to support pro-democracy groups in Croatia from 1998 to 2000.

## CROATIAN FINDINGS INFORM AN EVOLVING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MINDSHIFT

One of the larger looming questions in public diplomacy and foreign assistance has been about measurement. The effectiveness of assistance, whether agricultural, educational, health, or social development aid, is often difficult to assess. Indeed, it often takes years to see measurable outcomes for the targets of the aid: the citizens living in the recipient countries. Yet this study suggests that there are long-term implications for the outcomes of Western assistance to the civil society sector in Croatia.<sup>19</sup> In fact, the findings from this Croatian study inform an evolving public diplomacy mindshift.

One important finding of the study was to show that by 2002, the NGOs had emerged as independent actors in Croatian civil society efforts. Prior to 1996, Croatians had little experience with NGOs, but less than a decade later, random people on the street were familiar with local civil society organizations. Clearly, the values of NGOs, and an interest in civil society that had been an objective of the donor agencies, appear to have made an impact on Croatians.

Figure 7.1 shows that Croatians had become aware of civil society organizations. The results of the three survey questions suggest that Croatians generally believe that civil society organizations should cooperate with the government to improve the situation in Croatia. Croatians also believe that NGOs are very important for improving the situation in the nation. Yet Croatians do not appear as willing to participate in civil society. There seems to be gap between the perceived value of civil society organizations and an individual’s willingness to participate in them.



**Figure 7.1** Mean Score of Croatians Agreeing to Civil Society Questions  
 Answers calculated on five-point Likert scales with 1= strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree. Sample: 373 residents of Zagreb in 2000, 401 residents of Zagreb in 2002, and 406 residents of Zagreb in 2004.

The second research question asked which NGOs were the most active, influential, and trusted over the two time periods (2002 and 2004). Figure 7.2 shows that two NGOs—GONG (“a non-partisan citizens’ organization founded in 1997 to encourage citizens to actively participate in political processes”) and the Croatian chapter of Helsinki Human Rights (HHO) (“dedicated to “support, promote and implement the principles of the Final Act of Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed in Helsinki in August 1975”)<sup>20</sup>—account for 40–50 percent of the total responses to reputational questions.

Although there are thousands of NGOs registered with the Croatian government, only GONG and HHO emerged as national leaders in the 2002 and 2004 open-ended answers of Croatians. GONG “conducts non-partisan monitoring of the election process, educates citizens about their rights and duties, encourages mutual communication between citizens and their elected representatives, promotes transparency of work within public services, and manages public advocacy campaigns.” The Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (HHO) “support, promote and implement




Figure 7.2 Percentage of Total Responses to Statement about NGOs

principles of the UN relating to human issues, and implement in practice the documents of the Council of Europe, support the development of democratic institutions, and promote the rule of law, human rights, and education for these values.” HHO also organizes research and documentation regarding human rights in Croatia, and helps victims of violations of human rights and those whose rights are threatened.

To look for the long-term, sustainable impact of public diplomacy efforts, our research team tried to determine if the NGOs that had received significant financial and technical assistance from the United States and the EU before 2000 would continue to be trusted, active, and influential in civil society development as Croatia moved toward EU accession. Although countries do provide aid simply for humanitarian purposes, aid is often linked to outcome objectives and public diplomacy activities. Public diplomacy is measured according to public opinion about the sending country—but it should be measured in terms of the values—and the nature of the cross-national networks. Building social capital can lead to the growth of democratic principles and when this happens, it fulfills public diplomacy goals.

Of the five most frequently mentioned NGOs, three had been recipients of USAID support (GONG, Croatian chapter of HHO, and Green Action) in the past, but no longer required U.S. support to remain viable actors. Croatian NGOs were fulfilling civil society functions on their own and had found donors and supporters to offset large amounts of Western European and American assistance. The organizations were on their way to sustainability. For instance, a look at GONG tells a very compelling story: The year 2000 annual report of GONG indicates that the U.S. government donated over 1.3 million Kuna (about \$25,000) to support election-monitoring

activities. In 2001, however, donations from the U.S. government totaled only \$10,000. By 2002 and 2004, *there were no recorded donations from the American government or any U.S. government-affiliated organization.*

The relatively small amounts of financial and professional support provided to Croatian NGOs in the early years of the political transition were able to build a network of organizations, which in turn created social capital and strengthened the capacity of Croatian aid organizations, and ultimately generated not only short-term but also long-term public diplomacy results.

## OUTCOMES OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

What conclusions, recommendations, and ethical implications can we draw from the Croatian experience for public relations scholars and public diplomacy practitioners as they work to increase international understanding and build relationships with people across the world? Public diplomacy efforts from the United States and Europe to Croatia attempted to create and sustain a network of organizations that shared similar values. In doing this, foreign governments trained and financially supported election-monitoring organizations, human rights organizations, and environmental groups in Croatia. The data from the last two surveys suggest that even though the public diplomacy efforts that provided money for NGOs were short lived, the NGO partners continued in 2002 and 2004 to be viewed as influential, trusted, and active organizations in Croatian society.

Respondents in the three time periods leaned toward agreement that NGOs were important for improving the nation. Moreover, people surveyed agreed that they wanted NGOs to work with their government to improve the situation in Croatia. The response to the question about people's willingness to participate in civil society showed that only one in five people said that they wanted to participate in civil society organizations. We believe that one in five people off of the street is a reasonable response rate for such a question.<sup>21</sup> The numbers suggest there is a stable interest in civil society that previously did not exist.

Moreover, public diplomacy efforts built sustainable organizations that enact civil society today. Though the creation of sustainable like-minded organizations in other countries may not be a routine public diplomacy activity, it is a valuable outcome of public diplomacy efforts. The data from this study suggest that the NGOs that shared American and European values during the 1998–2000 transition are indeed continuing to advocate for issues that are building the social capital of the nation in 2004. The Croatian organizations were originally selected as partners because of their values: election reform, human rights, environmental protection, and voter education. Indeed, achieving success at building social capital and enacting public diplomacy activities like those in Croatia requires careful selection of like-minded partners.

GONG has evolved to a level that they now train NGOs in other nations in election monitoring and government reform. GONG has conducted training in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iraq, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, and several Central Asian countries. Such a level of cooperation further extends the initial public diplomacy impact by having GONG build the capacity of other organizations that share its value of election reform and transparency. Because of a modest public diplomacy effort to help the transition in Croatia, a dozen other nations have benefited from the capacity built.

The Croatian chapter of the Helsinki Human Rights organization (HHO) is part of an international network for human rights and cooperates with chapters throughout Europe. Its projects were also once funded by foreign governments, and now the Croatian HHO has worked on such issues as a Croatian Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), refugee returns, public right-to-know legislation, Roma rights, and media reform. All of the issues were topics of the public diplomacy efforts after the Dayton Peace Agreement. They are clearly important elements of civil society development and mirror the values of EU and U.S. public diplomacy activities.

### **Recommendations for Future Public Diplomacy Efforts**

A network approach to public diplomacy is premised on the assumption that inter-organizational relationships should be a foundation for theorizing about and practicing public diplomacy. Public diplomacy efforts, like public relations efforts, are most effective and most ethical when the activities create and extend relationships among people and organizations.

The authors would be remiss not to suggest that there are limitations to this study. First, a causal link cannot be established between the public diplomacy efforts and the attitudes of the Croatians who participated in the survey. Although the research team is confident that there is a link between the public diplomacy efforts and the sustainable capacity of the NGOs, there could be other factors that affected their development. Second, the findings of this research are a “lesson learned” for the U.S. government. Public diplomacy efforts need to extend beyond cultivating an image about the United States. Instead, efforts should be devoted to building relationships among American governmental organizations and local NGOs across the world. The same lessons also extend to other nations and countries interested in public diplomacy. Many cultural/diaspora groups only provide assistance to their own group’s members. By branching out, and supporting groups that have a broader civic reach, assistance can build relationships with a broader segment of targeted communities.

In terms of U.S. interests, building relationships with civil society organizations, NGOs, INGOs, etc., creates social capital and enacts the values of participation, democracy, and tolerance the United States hopes to share. If

U.S. public diplomacy professionals want people in other nations to think favorably about the United States, and to understand its ideological and political positions on global issues, then the goal of American public diplomacy should be to help sustain organizations that share U.S. values, including freedom of speech, human rights, and tolerance.

At the same time, public diplomacy scholars and professionals in every nation have more to learn about generating support for civil society initiatives, and more to do in terms of supporting public diplomacy via what might be described as modeled behavior. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, many nations put their public diplomacy eggs into an expensive one-way communication basket in an effort to use persuasion and propaganda to build support and trust.

Public diplomacy assistance that empowers local NGOs has long-lasting outcomes. The NGOs listed by the Croatian citizens are no longer dependent on U.S. or even European assistance. They have diverse funding sources and have become localized change agents. This is the real impact of those of who work in public diplomacy: building networks of organizations that share common values leaves a lasting effect that has local and global implications.

## NOTES

1. Marya Doerfel and Maureen Taylor, "Network Dynamics of Inter Organizational Cooperation: The Croatian Civil Society Movement," *Communication Monographs*, 71 (2004): 373–94; Maureen Taylor and Marya Doerfel, "Another Dimension to Explicating Relationships: Network Theory and Method to Measure Inter-Organizational Linkages," *Public Relations Review*, 31 (2005): 121–29.
2. Gifford D. Malone, "Managing Public Diplomacy," *The Washington Quarterly*, 8 (1995): 199–213, para 2.
3. Benno Signitzer and Carola Wamser, "Public Diplomacy: A Specific Government Public Relations Function," in *Public Relations Theory 2*, eds. Carl Botan and Vincent Hazelton (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2006), 435–64.
4. Signitzer and Wamser, *Public Diplomacy*.
5. The President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief, a multi-part, multi-country effort by the U.S. government to combat AIDS, malaria, TB, infant mortality, and other health-related issues in developing nations is one means to share cultural values and impart international views, without directly interfering in a nation's media or government.
6. Ronald S. Burt, "The Contingent Value of Social Capital," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 42 (1997): 339–65; Doerfel and Taylor, "Network Dynamics"; Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2000); Elizabeth L. Toth, "Building Public Affairs Theory," in *Public Relations Theory 2*, eds. Carl H. Botan and Vincent Hazelton (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2006).
7. James S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 98.

8. Peter Monge and Noshir Contractor, "Emergence of Communication Networks," in *The New Handbook of Organizational Communication*, eds. Fred Jablin and Linda Putnam (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000), 440–502.
9. Doerfel and Taylor, "Network Dynamics"; Taylor and Doerfel, "Building Inter-Organizational Relationships That Build Nations," *Human Communication Research*, 29 (2003): 153–81.
10. Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1999).
11. Holbrooke, *To End a War*.
12. USAID, *An Evaluation of USAID/OTI Political Transition Grants in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina*, research report published by the United States Agency for International Development (Office of Transition Initiatives, Washington, DC); Susie Jasic, "Monitoring the Vote in Croatia," *Journal of Democracy*, 11, 4 (2000): 159–68.
13. Sarah Mendelson and John Glenn, *The Power and Limits of NGOs* (New York: Columbia University, 2002).
14. Susie Jasic, "Monitoring the Vote in Croatia."
15. Taylor and Doerfel, "Building Relationships"; cf. also Doerfel and Taylor, "Network Dynamics."
16. USAID, *An Evaluation of USAID/OTI Political Transition Grants*.
17. The study piggy-backed on a USAID-funded media project's final evaluation. The researchers also cooperated with the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) on a media survey. The surveys were translated into Croatian and then back-translated to improve readability. Members of a national NGO with experience in survey research administered the surveys. The researchers conducted a pilot study to fine-tune the instrument. The surveyors were given detailed instructions, and they collected the surveys during different times of the day in various high-traffic locations around Zagreb. Questions used a five-point Likert scale, and are discussed below.
18. Mendelson and Glenn, *The Power and Limits of NGOs*.
19. The survey was administered to 373 residents of Zagreb in summer 2000; 401 residents of Zagreb in 2002; and 406 residents of Zagreb in 2004. In total, 1,180 surveys were usable, and used for analysis in the longitudinal study. The participant demographics closely matched demographic data on Croatians.
20. For a background on these two organizations, see their websites (<http://www.gong.hr>) and (<http://hho.hr>).
21. As a comparison, in the United States, one in four Americans volunteered or participated in civil society activities in 2011 (26.8 percent). See <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/volun.nr0.htm>.